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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis reflects the ongoing debate on Innere Führung and questions whether 
the principle is outdated, or how it is still of value for the Bundeswehr and Germany. 
After pointing out factors of internal instability for Germany and its society, vulnerable 
elements and threats to the core values of German citizenship are explained. The thesis 
further makes obvious how a strong level of resilience is necessary by presenting the fact 
of hybrid war threats, especially Russian information operations. Psychology serves as a 
means to explain why and how such methods of persuasion can be used in general. In 
order to develop and maintain a strong level of resilience against current internal and 
external threats, the thesis presents a way out of this dilemma by simplifying core 
elements of Innere Führung through the EDEN-Principle. This principle focuses on the 
development, practical implementation, and maintenance of democratic norms and an 
ethos of the soldier, based on the core values of citizenship. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Innere Führung, the leadership principle of the German armed forces, the 
Bundeswehr, faces a challenge of practical implementation in the transitions of society and 
arms of the 21st century. Especially after the end on conscription in 2011, civil-military 
relations seem to need an improvement in key aspects of the military, politics, and German 
society. Core values of citizenship and soldiering must be further developed, maintained, 
and transported within the model of the citizen in uniform despite enduring skepticism in 
society about soldiers in general and those in the military who want to embrace a simplistic 
cult of the warrior. 
In the first chapter, this thesis gives a brief overview on the internal development 
within the Bundeswehr, including current challenges of missions abroad, the ongoing 
debate on Innere Führung, and core values of citizenship in the self-perception of the 
soldier and German society. The Bundeswehr´s demand for more public acceptance, role 
models, and challenges regarding the development from a military focused on forward 
defense and a garrison role in the past (a so-called training army) into a force on perpetual 
deployment often far from Germany (a so-called Deployed Army) are significant 
challenging factors that will be covered as well. Focusing on internal aspects, issues of 
mass migration, deployments abroad, and the political support for the Bundeswehr will be 
discussed in the final part of this chapter. 
The second chapter points out further external challenges for Germany, including 
hybrid warfare, Russian psychological warfare and information operations, and the 
external influence on the domestic political development under aspects that pose a threat 
to a democratic country. Such threats as Russian information operations and 
hybrid/subterfuge/covert operations challenges will be analyzed in detail. This chapter 
points out and explain specific factors of vulnerability in order to prove the necessity for 
Germany—especially the Bundeswehr—to develop a strong level of resilience. An 
examination of the field of psychology will help to understand how methods of persuasion, 
like information operations, work. Isolating the weak points and vulnerabilities will open 
the opportunity to work specifically on improvement in these areas. 
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In the third chapter, this thesis raises the main argument that the Innere Führung 
needs practical improvement but is still helpful and adaptable to utilize the model of the 
citizen in uniform for the development and maintenance of core values of citizenship. The 
new developed EDEN-Principle is a possibility to translate main messages and elements 
of the Innere Führung into four practically adaptable fields that can continuously 
strengthen the vulnerable areas of German society and the Bundeswehr that were 
emphasized in the former chapter. 
By developing the ethos of the soldier and maintaining the practical outcome of 
Innere Führung, the EDEN-Principle can produce the positive and desired side effect of a 
strong level of resilience. A strong level of resilience against a variety of negative, anti-
democratic influences, such as Russian information operations, radical political parties, 
extremist movements, or terrorism is a vital factor of a country´s defense capability and 
internal stability.1 If a radicalization of the armed forces can generally be avoided, e.g., 
through strong civil-military bonds, a democratic ethos, and ethical core values of 
citizenship, the resilience against such destructive influences will persist. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Jamie Shea, “Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defence,” NATO Review, 2016. 
Also see: Uwe Hartmann, ed., NATO’s Adaptation (Miles-Verlag, 2017), and Michael Hanisch, “What 
Is Resilience? Ambiguities of a Key Term,” Bundesakademie Für Sicherheitspolitik, Security Policy 
Working Paper, no. 19 (2016): 4. 
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II. INNERE FÜHRUNG: AN OPEN DEBATE ON SOLDIERS 
AND CITIZENSHIP 
“In any given moment we have two options: To step forward into growth or 
to step backward into safety.” 
—U.S.-American Psychologist Abraham Maslow, 1908–1970 
The ongoing debate on Innere Führung2 and, therefore, also the core principle of 
German citizenship is a debate on values and self-perception of German state and society 
as well. The citizen in uniform is a not only a valuable principle of soldiering linked to 
citizenship and democratic norms, but it also reflects German society itself that aspires to 
limit the power of the state to do harm to the same citizens, whether it is in the barracks or 
on a battlefield or in parliament. To go with Maslow´s introductory quote, the option 
Germany choses will significantly influence the future of Germany; to distinguish which 
direction is forward and which one might rather be backward-oriented will be evaluated in 
this thesis as well. Which way Germany choses, will not only influence the German future, 
but it will also have an impact on how German society will be seen from its neighbor 
countries in future. 
The first chapter gives an overview of the ongoing debate on Innere Führung in 
Germany, specifically the period after the end of conscription in 2011. The self-perception 
of the soldier and the wish for role models will be addressed, as well as the possible change 
and development in the core principle of German citizenship. Following this introductory 
part of the thesis, the first chapter ends up by addressing aspects of vulnerability regarding 
migration, deployments abroad, and the political support for the German armed forces.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Armed Forces Staff Branch Fü S I 4, “Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1. Innere Führung 
(Leadership Development and Civic Education)” (Federal Minister of Defence, 2008). 
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A. THE ISSUE WITH THE SELF-PERCEPTION AND POSITIVE ROLE 
MODELS 
With a view to the challenge posed to western democracies on a broad front, this 
thesis states that a destabilization of the democratically rooted basis of the Bundeswehr 
would be equivalent to the failure of democracy in Germany, especially in association with 
the country´s history from 1819 until 1945. This development would most likely cause an 
alarming security risk for other member countries of the European Union or NATO and 
possibly lead to a domino effect of social and political instability. 
When it comes to the question whether the Bundeswehr has a lack of tradition and 
ethos or an issue with the soldiers’ self-perception and the wish for heroic role models in 
practice, one could argue rather for the latter. Often, it seems to be easier to follow a 
practical example or a heroic role model than theoretical and broad principles. Apart from 
the Wehrmacht in the Nazi regime and the Nationale Volksarmee (National People´s Army) 
in the former German Democratic Republic, Germany has a variety of memorable, positive, 
and ethically rooted traditions today. As the 2018 German “Traditionserlass” (Tradition 
Decree) points out, especially the resistance against the Hitler regime, but also the founding 
elements of the Bundeswehr and brave soldiers in current missions are worthy of 
remembering and preserving as the historical ideals of the German soldier.3 However, the 
implementation of these ideals and the political support of the German soldiers in practice 
seem to be in need of improvement. 
Actually, Innere Führung as a core principle of democratically-based leadership 
culture sets the main focus on integration of the soldier into constitutional principles, ethics, 
martial tradition, and a positive self-perception for the soldier in a democracy as an 
important part of the German state and society and the core principle of citizenship. The 
Bundeswehr is under development and internal reorganization. Apart from the multitude 
of deployments abroad, the Bundeswehr has faced a current challenge in stability and self-
perception, especially since the end of conscription in 2011. As many current Bundeswehr 
                                                 
3 “Die Tradition Der Bundeswehr. Richtlinien Zum Traditionsverständnis Und Zur Traditionspflege 
(Tradition in the Bundeswehr. Guidelines for Understanding and Maintaining Tradition)” (Ministry of 
Defense, 2018). 
 5 
missions are opposed by the majority of German society and the end of conscription caused 
a gap in civil-military exchange—compared to the former constant exchange through 
conscription—the military self-perception of citizenship as part of German society could 
also be challenged in a consequence. The Wehrbeauftragter des Deutschen Bundestages 
(Parliamentary Commissioner of the Armed Forces of the German Bundestag) stated in his 
latest evaluation that the Bundeswehr is “derzeit nicht einsetzbar” (not operational at the 
moment).4 This lack of readiness is an obvious factor of instability in European security 
that might also lead to a lack of security not only for the Bundeswehr but also for the 
Germany as a whole in the end. 
In addition, the self-perception of the German soldier is being transformed in the 
wake of the changing face of conflict and the upheaval in society. The deployments abroad 
(e.g., in Afghanistan), have led to discussions about the image and perception of the soldier, 
starting among a group of young Army officers and officer candidates of combat troops.5 
While the principle of leadership, the German Innere Führung, focuses on a democratic 
basis and roots in ethical and humanitarian core ideas, the wish for the image of a warrior 
rather than a citizen in uniform has steadily grown among young men and women who 
serve alongside others in ISAF and elsewhere.6 The widespread public appreciation of the 
soldier in other countries, especially in the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom, partially leads to dissatisfaction among German military personnel about public 
scorn and lack of popular affection. Added to this are public doubts about strategy, which 
is a problem of identification with the purpose of missions such as that in Afghanistan for 
German soldiers. The lack of public appreciation of both the soldiers and the missions itself 
by German politics leads to tensions between the military and German politics as an 
                                                 
4 DIE WELT, “Anhaltende Pannen: Wehrbeauftragter Hält Bundeswehr Für „derzeit Nicht Einsetzbar“ 
[Persistent Breakdowns: Armed Forces Commissioner Considers Bundeswehr ‘Currently Not Usable’],” 
DIE WELT, January 20, 2018, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article172662371/Anhaltende-
Pannen-Wehrbeauftragter-haelt-Bundeswehr-fuer-derzeit-nicht-einsetzbar.html. 
5 Marcel Bohnert and Lukas J. Reitstetter, eds., Armee im Aufbruch. [Army Awakening ] (Berlin: 
Miles-Verlag, 2014). 
6Anja Dr. Seiffert, “Aus Der Empirischen Feldforschung-Wofür Riskieren Soldaten Ihr Leben? [From 
Empirical Field Research-What Do Soldiers Risk Their Lives For?],” in Schützen, Retten, Kämpfen. Dienen 
Für Deutschland [Protect, Rescue, Fight. Serving for Germany] (Norderstedt, Germany: Carola Hartmann 
Miles-Verlag, 2016), 213–25. 
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outcome. In this context, the former Minister of Defense, Thomas de Maiziere (with a page 
taken from his father’s book of Prussian virtues), demanded from the soldiers in an official 
interview not to beg for recognition.7 A statement that caused a significant debate and a 
perception of a lack of appreciation for the military in the aftermath. 
Although the current German Minister of Defense, Ursula von der Leyen, 
implemented a new Tradition Decree in March 2018,8 the German soldiers’ desire for 
specific role models and appreciation persists. The new Tradition Decree offers perhaps an 
incomplete answer to this desire for such a specific guidance and rightly opens up a variety 
of broad opportunities for interpretation and individual decisions. This fact can be an 
opportunity but also creates the risk for wrong or even no guidance at all in the end. Such 
a partly perceived lack of guidance and orientation for subordinate leaders is difficult to 
overcome. Such a situation can open a path for radical movements to influence and 
manipulate individuals of the Armed Forces.  
As long as such terms as citizen in uniform or the specific role of citizenship and 
civil-military relations for the Bundeswehr and German society are not clarified and 
persistently explained, these factors of insecurity will remain unchanged. The case of 
Franco Albrecht9 in early 2017 made clear that the misbehavior of even one individual can 
unsettle the social structure and the German public’s trust in the Bundeswehr. In cases like 
this, the current fragility of mutual trust becomes obvious. 
 
                                                 
7 “Thomas de Maizière im Gespräch: „Giert nicht nach Anerkennung!“ - Inland - FAZ [Thomas de 
Maiziere in conversation: ‘Do not crave for recognition!’],” FAZ, sec. Politik, accessed May 24, 2018, 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/thomas-de-maiziere-im-gespraech-giert-nicht-nach-anerkennung-
12092201.html. 
8 “Die Tradition Der Bundeswehr. Richtlinien Zum Traditionsverständnis Und Zur Traditionspflege 
(Tradition in the Bundeswehr. Guidelines for Understanding and Maintaining Tradition).” 
9 “Terrorverdächtiger Soldat: Franco A. fiel früh als rechtsextrem auf,” Die Zeit, April 29, 2017, sec. 
Gesellschaft, http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2017-04/terrorverdaechtiger-soldat-
bundeswehr-rechtsextreme-thesen-masterarbeit. 
Note: the young Bundeswehr officer, Franco A., was initially charged with being a terrorist in a non-
transparent story that ended in the headlines and pivoted on an imitation machine pistol and steel helmet as 
symbols of a Nazi cult in the Bundeswehr. 
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B. THE GERMAN DEBATE ON INNERE FÜHRUNG 
In the generation since the end of the Cold War, the self-image of German society 
and politics grew indifferent to the former ideals of martial virtue, and with the end of 
conscription in 2010/11 generally lost interest in the fate of military reality that the soldiers 
had to cope with every day. In order to counteract this trend, this student’s thesis advisor 
in California, USA, Colonel Dr. Uwe Hartmann during his assignment as the Commander/ 
Military Dean of the Students’ Regiment at the University of the Bundeswehr Hamburg 
from 2010–2014 implemented a curriculum that was designed not only to familiarize 
young officers and officer candidates with the concept of Innere Führung but also to 
contribute to its further adaptation to changes in security policies and domestic politics. 
Encouraged by these discussions and following an example of others a half century ago in 
the turmoil of the 1960s (another Aufbruch), a group of students built a working group with 
the purpose to create a dialogue with society about the meaning of soldiering today. The 
result of this process was the publication of the book Armee im Aufbruch (Army 
Awakening) in 2014,10 a collection of statements and reports by young German officers of 
combat forces. Their very critical assessments indicated the starting point for an internal 
and public discussion on the German military, the society and the Bundeswehr´s self-
conception within the principle of Innere Führung. The sentiment of a crisis of personal 
identity, or better, an ethos as either a warrior or a soldier—i.e., the citizen in uniform—is 
mirrored in these articles; for example by Lieutenant Jan-Philipp Birkhoff in his essay 
about the role of the military leader in the Professor Herfried Muenkler’s “postheroic”11 
society that seems to have overcome heroism as a virtue.12 The claim for an ethos, more 
likely to aim for the picture of a warrior, stands at the end of this discussion and points 
towards the need, or even reality, of a special role of the soldier within the society. 
                                                 
10 Marcel Bohnert and Lukas J. Reitstetter, eds., Armee im Aufbruch. [Army on Departure] (Berlin: 
Miles-Verlag, 2014). 
11 Note: The term  “postheroic” was initially shaped by US scholar Edward Luttwak and later adapted 
by the German political scholar Herfried Münkler..  
12 Bohnert and Reitstetter, Armee im Aufbruch. [Army Awakening], 105–28. 
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Once the Crimean crisis hit soon followed by the refugee crisis in the years 2014–
2015 the hitherto silent question about the purpose of the military and the possible gap 
between social-political theory and military reality underwent a big bang in what is now 
an ongoing public, scholarly, and inner-military discussion. This debate concerns the fate 
of the citizen in a professional Bundeswehr without conscription as a time of significant 
change in politics and society that go far beyond the ranks of soldiers and also challenge 
the general principle of citizenship.  
If, as it new/old critics assert that Innere Führung has become outdated, or even 
completely irrelevant, the self-conception of the Staatsbürger in Uniform (citizen in 
uniform) would be rendered obsolete as well. This development would mean a real threat 
to civil-military relations and the embedding of the Bundeswehr in society within the ethos 
of a democratic-political basis—the core principle of German citizenship.  
The debate that began after the abandonment of conscription in 2012 took on new 
force in early 2017 with the case of the young Bundeswehr officer, Franco Albrecht (the 
so-called Franco A)., who was initially charged with being a terrorist in an odd story that 
exploded in the headlines and then pivoted on an illegal old French pistol, an imitation 
machine pistol and steel helmet as symbols of a Nazi or Wehrmacht cult in the Bundeswehr. 
After a series of high-level, expert seminars, in mid-November 2017, the German Minister 
of Defense, Ursula von der Leyen, published the first public draft for a new tradition decree 
for the German Armed Forces, the document that focuses on German military tradition—
in the current Bundeswehr after 1955 on a democratic basis—and declares once again as 
done in previous decades that the Wehrmacht and the German Democratic Republic´s 
(GDR) former Nationale Volksarmee (National People´s Army) as being no valid source 
of tradition for today’s military. The ongoing public, political and scholarly discussion on 
the implementation of the principle of Innere Führung, the soldier’s place and role in the 
society, as well as the contents and contours of a valid tradition, are once more in the 
headlines, a place these themes occupied in various episodes from the moment the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) decided to acquire armed forces in the years after 1949.  
Carolyn Halladay and Donald Abenheim point out that “Innere Führung is not 
outdated” and that “this [the German] society has the most to gain from  ‘rediscovering’ 
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Innere Führung—and the most to lose from failing to understand its enduring relevance to 
Germany, both today and tomorrow.”13  It serves as an advocate for the ethos of the soldier 
in a sense of the Innere Führung, rather than pointing out a need for the warrior ethos—
away from the society-embedded military—in comparison.  
Uwe Hartmann’s argument for the principle of Innere Führung on the one side 
creates an understanding for its core meaning and possible advantages, but on the other 
side he questions the political and social frame, in which the German soldiers have to act 
and do their duty. Here, the Bundeswehr´s development from a deterrence-oriented 
Ausbildungsarmee (Training Army) in the classical epoch of the Cold War toward a post-
1990 Einsatzarmee (Deployment Army) and the importance of a necessary change in 
leadership culture is the most significant aspect of circumstances.14  As is the case with 
those NATO armies that abandoned conscription beginning in the 1960s, Hartmann points 
out the possibility of an increasing gap between society and the Bundeswehr, which would 
become a major issue for German society, the core principle of citizenship, and its civil-
military relations.15  
Theology professor Christian Walther states that a conflict between the necessity 
of military duty in missions and the support for such missions by German society can be 
observed.16 Walther criticizes the lack of support by German society for politics and 
military and demands the development toward a more supportive civil society in Germany. 
Heiko Biehl on the other hand argues for the importance of mechanisms of integration into 
the society—especially after the end of conscription—which should be mainly developed 
                                                 
13 Donald Abenheim and Carolyn Halladay, Soldiers, War, Knowledge and Citizenship: German-
American Essays on Civil-Military Relations (Norderstedt, Germany: Carola Hartmann Miles-Verlag, 
2017), 40, 41. 
14 Uwe Hartmann, Innere Führung (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2007), 148ff. 
Note: The term Army serves as a historically grown pars pro toto in this context and stands for the 
whole Bundeswehr. 
15 Hartmann, IV.1. 
16 Christian Walther, “Was bewegt Soldaten? Zu Fragen soldatischer Mentalität [What moves soldiers? 
On questions of a soldierly mentality],” in Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2010 [yearbook Innere Führung 
2010] (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2010), 51–61. 
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by the Bundeswehr.17 Furthermore, Hartmann points out that a discourse about the Innere 
Führung in the context of hybrid war issues seems necessary. Hartmann shows how the 
circumstances of modern war scenarios—that is, the hybrid threats and conventional war 
in parallel—give proof for the still present significance of Innere Führung in a recourse for 
the current requirements of the Bundeswehr.18 The ongoing discourse clearly shows the 
ambiguous and complex nature of the understanding of Innere Führung and the current 
development of the core principle of citizenship in the view of German society. 
If Innere Führung failed in Germany, the democratic fundamentals of the country 
might have to be questioned as well by those who watch closely the character of 
nationalism in Germany and the revival of groups devoted to a violent understanding of 
what they today call “German identity,” but which is surely a well-known variant of 
integral nationalism. In addition to this challenge of a blood and soil nationalism and 
soldiers, the gap between military and society would be obviously proven. Such a 
development could underscore a process well visible, say, in the United States, with a 
military caste as “a state within the state” again.19 
C. MIGRATION, DEPLOYMENTS ABROAD, AND THE POLITICAL 
SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED FORCES 
A variety of factors currently lead to an increase in the problematic morale and 
discipline as well as operational effectiveness within the German Armed Forces. Apart 
from the already mentioned lack of personnel and the scarcity and neglect of operational 
military materiel—although a positive development in core missions such as in 
Afghanistan and Mali can be pointed out—the understanding and acceptance of the 
                                                 
17 Uwe Hartmann, Claus von Rosen, and Christian Walther, eds., Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2012 
[yearbook Innere Führung 2012] (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2012). 
18 Uwe Hartmann, ed., “Innere Führung und hybride Kriegsführung-Zur Bedeutung des Kriegsbildes 
für die Weiterentwicklung der Führungsphilosophie für die Bundeswehr [Innere Führung and hybrid 
warfare-On the significance of the war image for the further development of leadership philosophy for the 
Bundeswehr],” in Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2016 [yearbook Innere Führung 2016] (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 
2016), 137ff. 
19 Donald Abenheim and Carolyn Halladay, “Soldier and Politics in the United States: The Effects of 
the long War,” in Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2009 [yearbook Innere Führung 2009] (Berlin: BoD, 2009), 
117–25. 
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political purpose of missions (e.g., in Afghanistan), are significantly low.20 The majority 
of the German people does not know a lot about the missions in which the Bundeswehr is 
deployed. In the year 2017, only 18 percent of the German people felt well informed about 
the Bundeswehr´s missions in general; most Germans preferred non-military missions or 
missions of humanitarian support as a major focus instead.21 If German society’s lack of 
knowledge about the Bundeswehr’s missions is directly related to the lack of acceptance 
of missions abroad cannot be verified on this point.   
A common criticism is rooted in the lack of official political support for the 
Bundeswehr and the lack of meaningful public discussions on roles and missions of the 
Bundeswehr in general.22 Although the German people do not feel well informed about the 
Bundeswehr and the Armed Forces are not a popular topic in German politics, the standing 
of the Bundeswehr enjoys more respect in the perception of the German people than in the 
darker times of the cold war, for instance.23 The misperception of a significant number of 
German soldiers, especially officers, might therefore be rooted in the lack of public 
appearances and a desire for the kind of at times overwrought display of civil military 
affection as found in the U.S. or the UK, or, say, in Poland or Russia. 
The increased African and Middle Eastern migration toward Europe has led 
Germany to a social and political crisis since 2015. At the end of the year 2016, Germany 
registered an official number of 1.6 million refugees, which amounts to an increase of 113 
percent compared to the year 2014 in official numbers.24 This new social situation and the 
                                                 
20  Marcel Bohnert, Innere Führung Auf Dem Prüfstand. Lehren Aus Dem Afghanistan-Einsatz Der 
Bundeswehr [Innere Führung on the Test Rig. Lessons Learned from the Afghanistan Mission of the 
Bundeswehr] (Hamburg: DeutscherVeteranenVerlag, 2017), 60ff. 
21 Markus Steinbrecher, Heiko Biehl, and Chariklia Rothbart, “Sicherheits- und 
verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsbild in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2017 [security- and defense-
policy poll in the Federal Republic of Germany. 2017],” n.d., 6ff. 
22 Bohnert, Innere Führung Auf Dem Prüfstand. Lehren Aus Dem Afghanistan-Einsatz Der 
Bundeswehr [Innere Führung on the Test Rig. Lessons Learned from the Afghanistan Mission of the 
Bundeswehr], 59ff. 
23 Steinbrecher, Biehl, and Rothbart, “Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsbild in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2017 [security- and defense-policy poll in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
2017],” 37ff. 
24 Statistisches Bundesamt, “Destatis. Statistisches Bundesamt. Pressemitteilung Nr. 387 [Destatis. 
Federal Statistical Office. Press Handout No. 387],” February 2, 2017. 
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challenge to cope with such a huge number of mostly young, male, and unemployed 
refugees opened the opportunity of creating and manipulating a feeling of fear within the 
German population.25 The rise of the right-wing political party Alternative für Deutschland 
(AfD, Alternative for Germany) as well as the FPÖ. Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Free 
Party of Austria), in Austria was a major outcome of a populistic right-wing movement 
that could be observed in several regions of Europe at that time.26  
In addition, the fear of terrorist attacks in Europe grew significantly higher with 
every attack on European soil from 2015 onwards.27 The populist right-wing movements 
misused this fear in building up the perception of a connection between the refugees and 
potential terrorists, as well as the fear of Germany losing its own culture and traditions. 
Although the general connection between migration and terrorism can be seen as 
unjustified, the numbers of Muslim refugees in Europe encouraged this perception of fear. 
In 2017, the Pew Research Center published a related study, including a projection of 
possible growth of the Muslim population in Europe.28 In the three pictured scenarios (see 
figures 1 and 2), increases of the Muslim population in Europe are visualized, while the 
third scenario (the high migration scenario) could even strengthen the arguments and 
populist tactics of radical right-wing groups in Europe. 
Although the mentioned aspects are just a selection of major fields of vulnerability 
in German society, the general presence of such factors becomes visible. What affects 
German society, also affects the German military, the Bundeswehr, and the core values of 
citizenship, as a switch to the political extreme would also affect the democratic values of 
                                                 
25 Ruth Wodak, The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean, 1 edition (London: 
SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015). 
26 John Abromeit et al., eds., Transformations of Populism in Europe and the Americas: History and 
Recent Tendencies (London Oxford New York New Delhi Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017). 
And: 
Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg, Far-Right Politics in Europe, trans. Jane Marie Todd 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press, 2017). 
27“Chronologie: Attacken Auf Europas Metropolen [Chronology: Attacks on European Metropolises],” 
Spiegel Online, June 4, 2017, sec. Politik, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/terrorismus-in-europa-
eine-chronologie-a-1150645.html. 
28 Pew Research Center, “Europe´s Growing Muslim Population” (Pew Research Center, Washington, 
DC, USA, 2017). 
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a country. The next question must be how external and internal negative influences of all 
kind can use such vulnerabilities for their purpose at all and how a defense against such 
influences can be build up. A focus on the Bundeswehr—as a significant part of 
Germany—and the citizen in uniform within the principle of Innere Führung will help 
achieving this goal in the final part of this thesis. 
 
Figure 1.  Muslim future migration under three different scenarios in Europe.29 
                                                 
29 Pew Research Center, 5. 
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30 Pew Research Center, 10. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
Summarizing the different political, social, and military aspects of political and 
social upheaval and the weakening of democratic norms of citizenship, Germany faces a 
period of development and social change that contributes to the increasing instability of 
domestic politics in Germany while the international system is also in uproar. Since the 
German Bundeswehr has been highly integrated in the German society due to its core 
principle of citizenship and the former institution of conscription, these factors of 
instability have already had an impact on the political attitude, morale, discipline and 
service of military personnel. How the Bundeswehr can build up its own resilience through 
a strong and democratically based citizenship and a better implementation of the Innere 
Führung in practice and how a Bundeswehr with a solid esprit de corps in a vigilant 
democracy can contribute to enhancing the level of resilience for state and society will be 
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III. THE THREAT OF HYBRID WARFARE 
Information wants to be free. 
—Stewart Brand 
American Writer and Futurist (1984) 
 
In an increasingly interconnected, highly developing, and media-focused world, 
ideas that might have been science fiction a few years ago have become reality amid the 
shocks and upheavals of the 21st century. The Internet connects the world and opens up a 
new range of channels in media, radio, and television broadcasting as well. The distinction 
among those who are too indifferent to the duties of citizenship and too suffused of the 
putative pleasures of consumption and pleasure cannot distinguish quickly enough between 
fiction and reality—or better true or false—became a matter of complex evaluation and a 
requirement of a significant amount of knowledge. How and in what kind of purpose this 
modern information flow is manipulated and by whom and what possible threats emerge 
out of these circumstances will be focus of this part of the thesis. 
The second chapter points out the threat that especially Russian hybrid warfare—
that is, psychological warfare, subterfuge, covert operations, and coercive diplomacy—
creates not only for Germany but also for the European Union and NATO as an alliance. 
The specific German role in this context and the necessity for creating a strong “resilience” 
is part of this consideration. The term resilience as a key term of this thesis is ambiguous 
in its meanings and will be explained in context. Leading toward the final chapter, this part 
of the thesis raises the attempt to explain why an improvement is important in aspects of 
practice. To understand the basics and the heritage of this thought, a deep analysis, 
including aspects of human psychology, is at the core of this chapter. 
Today, NATO faces a threat that existed in a forgotten period of the cold war but 
the context of such aggression today requires a different answer than in former times. 
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Especially after the Russian annexation of Ukraine´s Crimean Peninsula in 2014,31 the 
hybrid threat of psychological warfare/information operations that Russia created has 
become starkly visible because the western powers neglected such a threat in an 
overemphasis on “Islamic fundamentalism” as the dominant form of conflict in the 21st 
century.32  
As a side effect of globalization, political, technical, economic, social, and 
information networks increased in almost the same manner, as the coherent future and 
current threats accumulated.33 As a consequence, NATO has to deal with the growing 
action of the Kremlin´s information operations. Reacting to or preventing such hybrid 
threats is not possible in the conventional way of traditional warfare. For instance, this 
phenomenon suddenly appeared in the heart of Berlin, with the supposed rape case of the 
girl “Lisa” in Germany, January 2016, when a false story was spread that a Volga Russian 
girl had been sexually assaulted by a refugee, a tactic targeted at the not inconsiderable 
emigrant German Russian community (i.e., ethnic Germans born on the territory of the ex 
USSR). The case illustrates not only that Russia is successfully using information 
operations to create political confusion and destabilize the European Union, but also how 
important a security and defense response to such threats has become currently.34 In the 
further course of this chapter, this example will be considered in detail. 
At the very beginning, this chapter points out selected examples of Russian 
information operations in the European Union (EU), especially in Germany. The second 
section deals with the aspects of resilience, the special example of Finland, and why it is 
of such significance and importance to analyze Finland´s best practices. This chapter’s 
examination of psychology helps to further understanding of the effects of information 
operations.  
                                                 
31 Stefan Meister and Jana Puglierin, “Perception and Exploitation: Russia´s Non-Military Influence in 
Europe,” DGAPkompakt,  no.10 (October 2015): 1. 
32 Note: Russia, the Kremlin or Moscow is in this paper related to the Russian government and the 
legacy of the current president Vladimir Putin, not to the Russian people in general. 
33 Shea, “Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defence,” 1–2. 
34 Stefan Meister, “The ‘Lisa Case’: Germany as a Target of Russian Disinformation,” NATO Review, 
2016, 3. 
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What this all amounts to in the final conclusion is that the growing threat of Russian 
information operations not only has the ability to destabilize the EU, but also creates an 
evolving threat for NATO. The possibilities and ways in which NATO can react to such a 
threat and, ideally, prevent its impact on the organization itself, its politics, and the people 
of the Western countries35 constitute one of NATO´s most challenging future tasks, highly 
dependent on each member country´s development of resilience.36 Germany as one of those 
member countries has to play its own role and find ways for future improvement and a 
better practical approach. This chapter focuses on the necessity of such a development and 
improvement, leading to the last chapter, which presents a concrete practical approach to 
implement a strong resilience based on democratic norms and core values of German 
citizenship. 
A. RUSSIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE/ INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS 
As long ago as the year 2012, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin,37 announced 
in his programmatic article “Russia and the Changing World”38 that he was willing to use 
information tools and other forms of intervention to achieve his foreign policy goals by 
naming those means soft powers. Today, it is obvious that he was already talking about 
what has become widely known as hybrid warfare and his planned use of information 
operations and spread of false or deceptive information in the upcoming Crimean crisis 
within Ukraine.39 Not just since the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula has the Kremlin 
under Putin´s rule focused on the centralization and stabilization of Russian power.40 For 
                                                 
35 Note: this paper defines the Western countries as the European democratic NATO-countries sharing 
the same values, as well as the United States of America. 
36 Shea, “Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defence,” 1–2. 
37 Note: Wladimir Wladimirowitsch Putin (Russian president 2000-2008, 2012-today) in the following 
named in the short form due to aspects of better readability. 
38 “Vladimir Putin: ‘Russia and the Changing World’ | Global Research - Centre for Research on 
Globalization,” February 27, 2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca/vladimir-putin-russia-and-the-changing-
world/5477500. 
39 Soldatov/Borogan;, Red Web by Soldatov/Borogan, edition (PublicAffairs, 2015), 275ff. 
40 Thomas Gomart, Russian Civil-Military Relations : Putin’s Legacy (Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 71f. 
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this aim, Putin particularly used the Internet and developed a network of disinformation,41 
but also political alliances with (or support for) far right and far left, anti-EU parties (Figure 
3) as well as pro-Russian organizations in Europe.42 The latter aspect poses a significant 
threat to Germany as the political spectrum is in a process of change and a variety of radical 
new offers for the individual go along with this. 
 
Figure 3.  Pro-Kremlin political parties in Europe.43 
                                                 
41 Soldatov/Borogan;, Red Web by Soldatov/Borogan, 223ff.  
42 Alina Polyakova, Atlantic Council of the United States., and Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, “The 
Kremlin’s Trojan Horses: Russian Influence in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom,” 2016, 3–4, 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/The_Kremlins_Trojan_Horses_web_1118.pdf. 
43 Polyakova, Atlantic Council of the United States., and Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, 5.; “note: * 
signifies that individuals associated with the party take a pro-Russian stance rather than the party itself.” 
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In the years since 2012, Moscow has strengthened its efforts on its information 
operations, particularly in Germany, as Putin identified German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel´s leading role after the Crimean crisis and her ambitions to implement EU sanctions 
on Russia as a threat to the accomplishment of Russian power objectives and his own 
aims.44 The conflation of fact and fiction as well as the disinformation and unsettling 
presentation of various so-called facts and a plurality of views45 became visible without 
limitation in the 2016 German case of “Lisa,”46 when the Kremlin demanded action by the 
German government. In this case, a girl named Lisa was supposedly raped by an immigrant, 
but the German government could not react or protect its citizens, as the Russian 
government´s representative stated on TV. Finally, this case was exposed as an example of 
Moscow´s fake news for the purpose of undermining the German people´s trust in their 
government. The Russian aim of exerting a destabilizing influence in the EU has been 
shown not only in the Kremlin´s efforts to develop its influence in the Western countries 
via the media, e.g., the news agency “RIA Novosti,” the radio programme “Voice of 
Russia,” and the TV channel “RT Deutsch,”47 but also its developing participation in the 
“German-Russian-Forum” and the “Petersburg Dialog,” both pro-Russian networks.48 
Furthermore, Putin has targeted the significant Russian-born German population (Figure 
4) to strengthen the power and influence of anti-NATO and anti-EU political parties, such 
as the German far right “Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany)” and 
the far left “Die LINKE (The LEFT).”49  
 
                                                 
44 Polyakova, Atlantic Council of the United States., and Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, 12. 
45 “Pomerantsev and Weiss - How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture an.Pdf,” accessed 
August 28, 2017, http://www.interpretermag.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/The_Menace_of_Unreality_Final.pdf. 
46 Meister, “The ‘Lisa Case’: Germany as a Target of Russian Disinformation.” 
47 Meister, 2. 
48 Polyakova, Atlantic Council of the United States., and Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, “The Kremlin’s 
Trojan Horses: Russian Influence in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom,” 13. 
49 Henry Meyer, “Putin Has a Really Big Trojan Horse in Germany,” Bloomberg.Com, May 2, 2017. 
And Meister, “The ‘Lisa Case’: Germany as a Target of Russian Disinformation,” 2–3. 
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Figure 4.  Geographical distribution of Russian Germans in Germany 
(1950–2010).50 
Putin´s information operations are nothing new, but use modern means for old 
Russian political procedures, such as “kompromat.” The Russian word kompromat has no 
direct English translations, it rather has the meaning of compromising a political opponent 
by denouncing, exposing, gathering, or even fabricating harmful information, documents, 
pictures, or revelations.51 Seen in an international sphere, Putin seems to simply follow old 
Russian traditions of power politics in a modern world.  
In a broader sense, this is not only a challenge for Germany, but for the EU and 
NATO as a whole. Putin is threatening the Western countries´ liberal order, their values, 
                                                 
50 Meyer, “Putin Has a Really Big Trojan Horse in Germany,” 7. 
51 Alena V. Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet 
Politics and Business, 1 edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 58ff. 
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the alliance´s virtues of openness, plurality, and dialogue by turning them into 
vulnerabilities and exploiting them.52 The threat for all Western countries remains current 
as the Kremlin´s action can be seen as an “unvirtuous circle...[that] can either begin with 
Russian political or economic penetration and from there expand and evolve, in some 
instances leading to ´state capture´.”53 The Crimean crisis is a perfect example of the 
actuality and significance of the Russian information operations threat to the EU and, in 
particular, Germany. How and in what way Germany can deal with this threat and what 
kind of practical improvements are necessary to gain a future resilience will be pointed out 
in the following. 
B. RESILIENCE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE TODAY 
Resilience against information operations is not only one of NATO´s primary aims, 
but also a highly important task for each single Western country.54 Especially for Germany, 
the importance of resilience has a specific significance in the concept of the citizen. Anti-
democratic movements and a development against democratic norms and values pose a 
threat to this core element of German society and civil-military relations in addition. This 
thought will be picked up again in the final chapter in order to present a practical approach 
to develop this kind of resilience in further detail.  
The concept of resilience is used in many different fields, such as ecology, social 
sciences, and engineering, but relates always to the Latin word “resilire,” which means “to 
spring back” or “to rebound.”55 In a general way, this term describes the ability to resist or 
surpass negative outer influences and circumstances;56 circumstances, such as Russian 
information operations, aiming for a directed destabilization of political opponents, either 
                                                 
52 “Strange Bedfellows: Putin and Europe’s Far Right,” World Affairs Journal, accessed August 28, 
2017, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/strange-bedfellows-putin-and-europe%E2%80%99s-far-
right. 
53 “Conley et Al. - 2016 - The Kremlin Playbook Understanding Russian Influe.Pdf,” 12, accessed 
August 28, 2017, http://www.csd.bg/fileadmin/user_upload/160928_Conley_KremlinPlaybook_Web.pdf. 
54 Shea, “Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defence.” 
55 “Resilience | Define Resilience at Dictionary.Com,” accessed September 5, 2017, 
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/resilience. 
56 Hanisch, “What Is Resilience? Ambiguities of a Key Term,” 1–2.  
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like single Western countries like Germany or the whole organization of NATO. 
Consequently, it is of vital interest for both single Western countries and NATO as an 
organization to build and strengthen their ability to resist—to show resilience—against the 
hybrid threats of Russian information operations in order to protect their own system and 
their ability to act.  
The example of Finland shows that resilience against Russian information 
operations is not only possible, but also has been done for many years..57 NATO can only 
act as an organization in its own structures and is dependent on the growing resilience of 
its single member countries like Germany. Therefore, every single NATO member country 
has to develop an essential strategy to face the threat of Russian information operations by 
the means of a strong resilience.  
1. Exempla Gratia: Finland 
Finland´s successful strategy of resilience can serve as an efficient object lesson for 
every Western country. The political scientist and associate editor of the magazine Foreign 
Policy (online version) Reid Standish shows in one of his articles how Finland was and 
still is able to resist Russian information operations and build up its own concept of 
resilience.58  Finland maintains a lively heritage of the citizen in uniform and the memory 
of the military resistance to Soviet aggression in 1939 is a key part of the self-image of the 
Finnish armed forces, to say nothing of service at arms against the Russians over a 
significant part of national history. The ideal of total defense, the dominant concept of 
national security in Scandinavia, celebrates citizenship on a model of armed neutrality and 
the role of each citizen as an irregular soldier to defy an occupier.  
Like many other countries, Finland has been attacked by Russian information 
operations since Moscow’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. Standish 
describes the means of Russian information operations not only as Russian-based fake 
news and conspiracy theories, but also as the Russian attempt to focus the media on actually 
                                                 
57 Reid Standish, “Why Is Finland Able to Fend Off Putin´s Information War?,” Foreign Policy, March 
1, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/01/why-is-finland-able-to-fend-off-putins-information-war/. 
58 Standish. 
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existing problems and difficulties that Finland has. It becomes clear that building up a 
strong concept of resilience is the responsibility of every single country, first and 
foremost.59 Finland´s example, which Standish describes, is quite useful, because it seems 
to be transferable to every other Western country as well.  
The most convincing aspect of Standish´s article relates to a statement by Jed 
Williams, director of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Center for Global Engagement at 
Harvard, who argues: “The best way to respond is less by correcting the information, and 
more about having your own positive narrative and sticking to it.”60 Hired by the Finnish 
government, Williams helped the Finns develop a “public diplomacy program,” which 
started to face the Russian information operations threat in two steps, Standish summarizes. 
According to Standish, the first step is officially acknowledging the threat as a fact, 
followed by the second step of establishing a strong education system that leads to an 
understanding and recognition of Russian information operations by the critical thinking 
skills (that is to say, the virtues of citizenship) of, in this example, the Finnish population.  
To sum it up, both steps seem to be of vital importance, the official 
acknowledgement of the threat by the government and the following specific education of 
the population in order to build up resilience (i.e., the enabling of the population to resist 
Russian information operations). Main aspects and core elements of Finland´s solution can 
be adapted for Germany and be included in already existing own concepts in the end. 
Especially the aspect of education and political responsibility as features also of Innere 
Führung will be discussed in the last chapter of this thesis. 
Therefore, the example of Finland shows how adopting the Finnish concept of 
resilience in security and citizenship could work for other Western countries, such as the 
Germany as a target of Russian subterfuge. Even though it is not necessary to adopt the 
full Finnish concept one-to-one, core elements that proved successful in practice can be a 
valuable factor to borrow. Furthermore, a concept of resilience is not only necessary for 
every country that Russia attacks with hybrid means, but is also feasible, with manageable 
                                                 
59 Also see: Shea, “Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defence,” 3. 
60 Standish, “Why Is Finland Able to Fend Off Putin´s Information War?,” 1. 
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efforts of time and money. Germany started to focus on the Russian threat after officially 
acknowledging it in the Lisa case, and learned its lesson by building up a better education 
of the population, based on a strong German media network, as well as a stable democratic 
party environment.61 It is still not realistic to analyze this as well-established or perfect 
resilience, such as in the example of Finland. But it shows developments in the right 
direction and as well the necessity as the possibility for the Western countries to resist 
Russian information operations in general. 
2. Examination: Psychology of Information Operations 
After the significance of a strong resilience, especially under current political 
circumstances, has been previously discussed, it is important to understand how and why 
negative influences can have an impact on the individual at all. Only when the source of 
individual vulnerability and the reason for it can be pointed out, a solution in form of 
individual resilience can successfully be created. How to influence people´s opinions and 
their attitudes as a consequence is one aspect of social psychology. Although, this excursus 
does not attempt to discuss every possible psychological aspect of Russian information 
operation´s effects in detail, it can show and analyze aspects of the psychological field of 
“persuasion”62 generally. Persuasion does not automatically mean manipulation, but is 
rather an objective term with a very broad definition, which gets its positive or negative 
direction by the user, or better, influencer and the way persuasion is used.63 Defining 
persuasion is, generally speaking, a difficult task, because there is no such thing as an 
absolute, sharp-edged distinction between those actions that could be described as 
persuasion and those which could not;64 or even where positive aspects start and maleficent 
                                                 
61 “Russian Hackers Can’t Beat German Democracy,” Foreign Policy (blog), n.d., 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/03/russian-hackers-cant-beat-german-democracy-putin-merkel/. 
62 Def.: “the process by which a person´s attitudes or behavior are, without duress, influenced by 
communications from other people”: 
“Persuasion | Psychology | Britannica.Com,” accessed September 5, 2017, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/persuasion-psychology. 
63 Nick Kolenda, Methods of Persuasion: How to Use Psychology to Influence Human Behavior 
(Kolenda Entertainment, LLC, 2013), 2–3. 
64 Daniel J. O′Keefe, Persuasion: Theory and Research, 2nd edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, Inc, 2002), 1–2. 
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aspects of persuasion, such as lying or deception by manipulation, end. Nevertheless, a 
common definition of persuasion, by Herbert Simons, describes the term broadly as 
“human communication designed to influence others by modifying their beliefs, values, or 
attitudes.”65 
Influencing people´s opinions and gaining their support is one of the main means 
to influence foreign policy.66 As the example of Germany´s Lisa case has already shown, 
the emotional impact of Russian information operations can have a big influence on 
people´s behavior and beliefs, even more than real physical or financial injury.67 
Especially, persuasive language,68 as well as focusing people´s fears via repetitive 
rhetoric69 by Russian officials against European governments, demonstrates how Russia 
uses propaganda methods to create an enemy-picture,70 exploiting the tactics of persuasion 
in the worst way. The Kremlin has utilized such persuasive tactics, making them a 
maleficent means of manipulation, in order to weaken peoples´ trust in their government. 
Again, this is not a new idea, but the simple use of psychology, as Harvard University 
professor Roger Brown´s “Flashbulb Memory Theory” of the late 1970s shows by 
highlighting the importance of peoples´ emotions to create vivid memories of a highly 
emotional situation´s circumstances and feelings, but few actual facts concerning the 
outcome of the situation in the end.71 Following this academic approach, the outcome of 
                                                 
65 Persuasion: Understanding, Practice and Analysis (Addison-Wesley Series in Speech 
Communication) by Simons Herbert W. (1976-12-01) Hardcover, n.d., 21. 
66 Yoel Cohen, MEDIA DIPLOMACY: The Foreign Office in the Mass Communications Age. (London, 
Great Britain: FRANK CASS AND COMPANY LIMITED, 1986), 83. 
67 Yvonne de Kort et al., eds., Persuasive Technology: Second International Conference on Persuasive 
Technology, PERSUASIVE 2007, Palo Alto, CA, USA, April 26-27, 2007. ... Papers, 2007 edition (Berlin: 
Springer, 2008), 50–51. 
68 Charles K. West, The Social and Psychological Distortion of Information (Chicago: Burnham Inc 
Pub, 1981), 72–73. 
69 Ruth Wodak, The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean, 1 edition (London: 
SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015), 130. 
70Also see: John Abromeit et al., eds., Transformations of Populism in Europe and the Americas: 
History and Recent Tendencies (London Oxford New York New Delhi Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2017), xiv–xv. 
71 Stephen Worchel and Wayne Shebilske, Psychology: Principles and Applications, Subsequent 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Pearson, 1995), 203. 
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the Lisa case in Germany is not so important in people´s memories as a consequence of 
this; people´s behavior and beliefs, like the first emotional impression of the violent rape 
of a young girl and the failure of the German government to protect her stayed primary, 
even though this was proven wrong and a Russian information operation in the end. 
The impact of Russian information operations on peoples´ beliefs and trust can lead 
to a long-term change in their values and behavior. The principle of the “Social Identity 
Theory” makes clear that—even out of those influenced memories and persuasive beliefs—
new social identities as an individual´s self-conception, being a member of a group or 
society, can change fundamentally.72 This can lead to a mistrust of one´s own government, 
based on the manipulation of Russian information operations through persuasive tactics, 
which weaken people´s support for the government and strengthen anti-governmental 
parties or movements as an outcome. The German examples of the Russian-supported far 
right party “Alternative für Deutschland” (Alternative for Germany) and the far left party 
“Die LINKE” (The LEFT) perfectly serve as a proof for such a development. 
“In real life, as well as in experiments, people can come to believe things that never 
really happened,” concludes the distinguished professor of psychology Elizabeth Loftus in 
her long-term memory studies.73 This is a perfect core statement referring to the aim of 
Russian information operations as well. As it is not necessary to find and show facts to 
convince or persuade somebody—provided morality or ethics do not matter—the 
manipulation of significant parts of a country´s population is not only possible but done 
daily in foreign policy in the Kremlin´s hybrid war. 
This vulnerability to negative influences, including a possible change of beliefs and 
attitude toward the own government or even democratic norms, can develop a real threat 
for a country like Germany. A development toward a lack of trust regarding German 
democratic norms, democratic core values, or a citizenship that is rooted in these basic 
                                                 
Susan Nolen-Hoeksema et al., Atkinson & Hilgard’s Introduction to Psychology, 15 edition (Andover: 
Wadsworth Pub Co, 2009), 291–93. 
72 Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances 
(New York: Prentice-Hall, 1990), 2–3. 
73 Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony, 2 New edition (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1996), 62. 
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assumptions, can cause an issue of destabilization, especially for the military and in civil-
military relations. Developing and maintaining a strong resilience over these negative 
factors and persuasive influences (e.g., Russian information operations), must, therefore, 
be a major aim as an outcome. Consequently, the following last chapter of the thesis 
focuses on a practical approach to provide a way to develop, improve, and maintain 
democratic norms, resilience, and strong civil-military relations in the Bundeswehr and in 
Germany via the EDEN-Principle. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Russian information operations are not only a challenge for Germany but also for 
the EU´s and NATO´s peace and security. This chapter revealed the significant 
responsibilities of every single NATO member country, especially Germany, in order to 
develop its own resilience and to strengthen the alliance, as well as to build the ability to 
face this threat of information operations. The research also uncovered the fact that Russia 
is not inventing or even using new methods, tactics, or techniques, but is recycling old 
Russian political traditions, such as kompromat. Russia also uses simple theories of social 
psychology in practical adaptation, propaganda, and simplified persuasion to manipulate 
foreign public opinion. Understanding and acknowledging these means is the first step on 
the path of successful future improvement and of increasing the own resilience. Germany 
has to develop, maintain and improve the practical aspects of its resilience in future. 
Predicting possible further developments of hybrid war will remain a challenge to react to 
and protect against Russian information operations. NATO in general and the Western 
countries specifically must develop their resilient abilities perpetually. A strong German 
resilience will not only strengthen the Bundeswehr and German society from within, but it 
will also provide a significant factor of stability for the EU and NATO in the end. 
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IV. THE EDEN-PRINCIPLE: INNERE FÜHRUNG IN PRACTICE 
I cannot teach anybody anything. I can only make them think. 
—Greek Philosopher Socrates (470–399 BC) 
A solid and strong self-perception of citizenship and the soldier with roots in 
democratic values leads to an equally strong and stable level of resilience against insidious 
threats of all kinds to morale and operational effectiveness. The German Armed Force´s 
principle of leadership, Innere Führung, provides an ideal and practice of a democratically-
based military, humanistic focused core values, and strong democratic civil-military 
relations.74 Yet, the practical implementation of this principle in the life of the soldier and 
in the affairs of government faces the challenge of chronic misunderstandings by those who 
falsely claim that effective constitutions, rule of law, command and obedience based on 
checks and balances and a role for parliament in peace and war are, somehow, an 
abstraction. Today, the internal stability of the German Armed Forces, the Bundeswehr, 
may well be in decline or not, as the ethos of the soldier is changing and the gap between 
the military and society seems to have widened since the end of conscription in the year 
2011. Hybrid attacks and extremist terrorism as well as geopolitical upheaval aim to 
destabilize Germany—and other European countries—including the armed forces. And 
yet, NATO missions with participation of the Bundeswehr, like the current “Enhanced 
Forward Present (EFP)” mission in the front state NATO allies on the Russian border, are 
still as unpopular in German society as the ISAF mission.75 The discrepancy between actual 
reality and perceived threats becomes clear in reference to German society yet again. This 
chapter focuses on how democratic self-perception—or ethos—can be achieved and 
maintained and in what way German politics, society, and the Bundeswehr can work 
                                                 
74 Armed Forces Staff Branch Fü S I 4, “Joint Service Regulation ZDv 10/1. Innere Führung 
(Leadership Development and Civic Education).” 
75 Heiko Biehl, Chariklia Rothbart, and Markus Steinbrecher, “Cold War Revisited? Die deutsche 
Bevölkerung und die Renaissance der Bündnisverteidigung [German Society and the Renaissance of 
collective Defense],” in Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2017 [yearbook Innere Führung 2017] (Miles-Verlag, 
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against a possibly increasing gap in civil-military relations that enables the opponents of 
the basic constitutional order in the FRG to advance their aggressive goals. 
First, this chapter points out the role of the German Armed Forces in a democratic 
society and the impact that armed forces can have in a negative or positive way. In the 
second part, the “EDEN-Principle”76 will be explained as possible means to strengthen 
Germany´s resilience from within the Armed Forces. In a four-step-approach, the principle 
explains the core elements of a successful implementation of Innere Führung in practice. 
Finally, this chapter attempts to transform the theoretical approach into a selection of 
practical improvements in the field of the Bundeswehr, German society, and German 
politics. 
A. THE ARMED FORCES AS A CORE FACTOR OF STABILITY 
Obedience and disobedience are a significant factor when it comes to the evaluation 
of armed forces in a democracy. In the case of the Bundeswehr, the historical background 
of perverted command and obedience under national socialism in the Wehrmacht comes to 
mind. Not only was this blind obedience a core element of the totalitarian Nazi system; it 
was also the crucial factor hindering any democratic development or humanitarian values. 
Actually, the totalitarian, anti-democratic rise of Nazi Germany led to the “vanguard of 
Nazism—an alliance whose appalling results have cast a shadow over Germany´s military 
tradition that reaches to the present.”77 The negative impact that the failure of the armed 
forces can have on a country, therefore, becomes perfectly clear in the German case.  
Although the armed forces can be a foundation element of totalitarian or anti-
democratic systems, they can also be crucial to defend democracy or help to transform a 
country into a democracy.78 Especially after World War II, West Germany had to face the 
                                                 
76 Note: The EDEN-Principle will be explained in further detail. The abbreviation stands for E 
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77 Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed 
Forces (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014), 16. 
78 Gerhard Kümmel, “The Winds of Change: The Transition from Armed Forces for Peace to New 
Missions for the Bundeswehr and Its Impact on Civil–military Relations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 26, 
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challenges of a transformation into a successful democracy, while East Germany was 
accorded a new form of totalitarianism on the Soviet model. Overcoming the former 
perception of blind obedience as a military virtue was one of the challenges for the new 
Bundeswehr developed after 1955. While the establishment of West-German Armed 
Forces was immediately a subject of intense controversy in the young West Germany, the 
“ideal of the Staatsbürger in Uniform (citizen in uniform) became the catch phrase of 
reform and a subject of much controversy and misunderstanding.”79 This core element of 
the Innere Führung, the soldier who is not only a citizen but also part of civil society, raised 
the value of the individual and the importance of strong and healthy civil-military relations 
in a democracy from the beginning.80 In fact, it was a difficult-to-understand process for 
those skeptical about any soldiers at all or among those who still thought the Wehrmacht 
to have been a pretty good army, with no faults at all. This skepticism was even stronger 
in a West-German society that did not want to establish anything related to the military or 
armed forces ever again.81 The latter attitude became perhaps the chief lesson of the war 
in the self-image of West Germany and United Germany.  
Distinguishing between aspects of moral—right or wrong—and the necessity to 
disobey in extreme situations of command and combat is a very complex and multilayered 
task which is every more alien to those with no military experience. Borrowing a metaphor 
from the New York Times columnist Roger Cohen, a guide dog for blind people faces its 
most difficult task when trained to disobey.82 Even if this metaphor pictures the complex 
task of learning to decide whether it is the situation to obey or disobey for a dog—based 
on a right-or-wrong spectrum—the complexity is the same for human beings, just at a 
higher level of evaluation and decision process.  
Morality, experience, and ethics cannot be easily learned or taught. Especially for 
military personnel, the variety of different and complex situations to make a decision 
                                                 
79 Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross, 81. 
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between ethically right or wrong (e.g., in a mission abroad), can be overwhelming. The 
regulation Innere Führung gives a variety of well-developed and universal principles but 
does not give many direct instructions for their practical implementation. A strong self-
perception and roots in a democratic society are as important for the German soldier as is 
the understanding of ethical norms. Because of that, an applicable, as simple as possible, 
and coherent principle has to be developed in order to help the soldier in implementing the 
sublime theoretical approach of Innere Führung and the resilient ethos of the soldier in 
practice. 
B. THE EDEN-PRINCIPLE 
The EDEN-Principle represents an attempt to develop a practice-focused approach 
that promotes an appropriate self-perception, based on democratic values of citizenship, 
and that is adaptable for all military levels, society, and political needs at the same time. 
Following the idea of a simple and applicable approach that focuses on main aspects, such 
as education (E), democratic self-perception (D), a well-balanced and modern ethos of the 
soldier (E),83 and strong, stable norms (N) as an outcome, the EDEN-Principle leads to an 
auspicious possibility of a strong future level of resilience for the Bundeswehr and German 
society as a whole (compare figures 5 and 6).  
The EDEN-Principle points out a 4-step-approach to develop a resilient and strong 
self-perception of the German soldier that leads to common democratic norms and shared 
values as the final outcome. Furthermore, the EDEN-Principle is intended to help military 
leaders, regular soldiers, German society, and political leaders to understand and maintain 
the transparent, practically-oriented, and democratic ethos of the soldier. As the 
Bundeswehr mirrors a heterogenic part of German society, the EDEN-Principle is rooted 
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in the rationale of a very broad pick up point for the single citizen and also a goal-driven 
outcome of common norms and values in the end. Hereby, the EDEN-Principle can develop 
democratic norms, maintain them, and also lead toward a common basic understanding and 
shared values of democratically-based norms. The final outcome of the EDEN-Principle is 
the practical reflection of the Innere Führung through the ethos of the soldier. 
The first and most important step of the EDEN-Principle is the establishment of a 
common, broad, and distinguished education to include the core values of citizenship. 
Especially, the history of Germany, Europe and the German Armed Forces has to be a main 
focus of this section. Only understanding and knowing about a country´s own history 
enables a citizen to evaluate and classify historic and current circumstances, draw 
conclusions from it, and learn for future improvement. The German school system has a 
well-developed curriculum of history lessons, which also focuses on German history and 
the Nazi regime in World War II. The perception of the relevancy of history and the interest 
in it are significantly high among students.84   
The knowledge about the concentration camp Auschwitz-Birkenau is—with above 
86 percent—well marked in German society, while only 46 percent of younger students 
between 14–16 years of age know about it in general.85 As a result, the specific knowledge 
about German history can be evaluated as a declining aspect in the same manner as the 
individual connection to historic events and the personal dismay of the Nazi regime fades 
away in the perception of especially younger students. Still, the general interest in history 
is a vital advantage that can be utilized in order to further develop not only a common 
knowledge but also an understanding of the core values of citizenship, even after school. 
In the Bundeswehr, the key factor of this approach is a profound and comprehensive 
education in history and politics from the beginning on.86 
Building on the first element of a well-developed education, the value of the 
German democracy, especially within the Bundeswehr in its early history in the 1950s and 
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1960s, can be pointed out and understood in detail.87 In relation to the German democratic 
development, democracy becomes clearly visible as a significant and valuable achievement 
when contrasted to the record of government and state in previous epochs. The Bundeswehr 
is part of this development and a vital element of the Federal Republic of Germany. Rooted 
in the Basic Law and under executive and parliamentary control,88 that is, it is not a thing 
in itself or a state within a state, the Bundeswehr embodies German way of democracy and 
the rule of law versus some cult of warriors and gunmen for hire. If this connection can be 
explained in a proper way and the value of its role within the Armed Forces is understood, 
the strengthening factor of pride and belief in the mission and the importance of the 
Bundeswehr as part of German democracy becomes concrete.89 A soldier convinced of his 
own relevance in the everyday and also higher aspects of service, the importance for the 
German democracy, and the value of the Bundeswehr within the German state and society 
as well as the in the international system, will be more resilient against radical and anti-
democratic influences in general. This goal was a core and original one of Innere Führung 
in the 1950s, just as the Prussian reformers wanted a soldier who had rights as well as 
duties, so that he would serve and fight in an effective manner and not break and run in the 
thick of battle.  
The ethos of the soldier can be progressively built up on the basis of the first two 
steps. Innere Führung envisions this core competency as the element of character or 
personality formation.90 Such an idea is based in Clausewitz, but also in a canon of German 
military writing of great lineage.91 The outcome of this positive and democratically-based 
ethos of the soldier must be the direct focus of the practical approach. Especially in this 
third step of the EDEN-Principle, an ongoing and permanently reviewed, practically 
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oriented training, role plays, or even community events have to be implemented.92 Not only 
the democratic understanding of the role of the Bundeswehr in practice is part of this ethos 
development and maintenance, but also the aspect of civil-military relations and the 
internal, social stability of the German Armed Forces. A strong bond to the society, or 
better, the self-perception as an important part of the democratic society, and an ethically-
based, wealthy “band of brothers” are vital aspects of a stable, strong and resilient ethos of 
the soldier in the end.93 This is nothing that would exclude each other. Furthermore, it is 
the aim to reach both in the perfect outcome of a democratic self-perception; this is the 
core element of the ethos of the soldier. 
Furthermore, in detail the ethos of the soldier is based on an individual self-
perception. The attitude toward others depends on the attitude toward oneself. The self-
perception therefore influences the evaluation of others and the possibility of a 
development of common norms. In other words, “how students view themselves influences 
their views of others.”94 First and foremost, not only the individual student but also the 
individual soldier must develop his personal ethics in order to develop common and shared 
norms.95 The deeper self-perception of being a part of the society, without a special role in 
it, and the understanding of a leadership principle of leading through conviction and trust, 
not just simple orders, must be the aim for an individual ethos at first.96 The fact that the 
soldier in German society—and the Bundeswehr in general—is highly valued, can help in 
this process.  
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Against the common perception that most German citizens do not hold the 
Bundeswehr in high regard, the “Center for Military History and Social Science in the 
Bundeswehr” (Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften in der 
Bundeswehr) proved that, in contrast to the late cold war epoch, 80 percent of German 
society has a very positive attitude toward the Bundeswehr and think that the Armed Forces 
are important for Germany.97 However, since 2011 and the end of conscription, the German 
people´s trust in the Bundeswehr has declined from 53 to 45 percent, which is the lowest 
level since the end of the draft.98 Public confidence in the operational capability of the 
Bundeswehr is significantly poor at 20–30 percent.99 This fact means that parts of German 
society values the Bundeswehr with its soldiers very well and considers them important, 
but has a lack of confidence when it comes to  operational readiness and a general trust in 
the ability to fulfill the mission of the Armed Forces. This differentiation embodies a vital 
aspect for the individual to understand the role of the Bundeswehr as part of German society 
and the civilian appreciation that is not necessarily connected to politically ordered 
missions or structural and internal weaknesses in general.100 
As a final outcome, shared norms can be drawn from the progressively repeated 
and developed first three steps. The knowledge about the country´s own history and 
especially Germany´s democratic development, the understanding of the Bundeswehr´s 
own important role as part of the democratic society, and the practically implemented and 
permanently maintained development of the ethos of the soldier will lead to persistent, 
stable, democratically-based norms for every individual in German society, civilian or 
military. Such ethical norms can not only provide a stable level of resilience despite 
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challenges such as missions abroad, internal structural changes, or negative, radical 
influences, but they can also prove vital for a strong basis of resilience in the end.101 
All the steps of the EDEN-Principle are interconnected and permanently revisited 
in a repeatedly evaluated process. Especially, steps 1 and 2 (E-D) as well as steps 3 and 4 
(E-N) have a high proportion of overlapping elements and interconnect with each other 
(see Figure 5). This flexible and actively developing character is a strong aspect of the 
EDEN-Principle. It is not a static construct but rather an adaptable and modern approach 
that has roots in core values and shared norms of democracy.  
 
 
Figure 5.  The EDEN-Principle: A 4-step approach. 
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C. RESILIENCE THROUGH A STRONG SELF-PERCEPTION AND AN 
ADVANCED PRACTICAL APPROACH 
By developing the ethos of the soldier and maintaining the practical outcome of 
Innere Führung, the EDEN-Principle can produce the positive and desired side effect of a 
strong level of resilience. A strong level of resilience against a variety of negative, anti-
democratic influences, such as Russian information operations, radical political parties, 
extremist movements, or terrorism is a vital factor of a country´s defense capability and 
internal stability.102 If a radicalization of the armed forces can generally be avoided, e.g., 
through strong civil-military bonds, a democratic ethos, and ethical core values of 
citizenship, the resilience against such destructive influences will persist. 
The practical adaptation of these core ideas of the EDEN-Principle is an enduring 
and recurring task for various echelons of command. With every new generation of 
soldiers, the four-step-approach starts from the beginning. Even though older and 
experienced soldiers can pass on and share their experiences and the developed norms, i.e., 
the ethos of the soldier, a permanent process of revision and control will remain necessary 
in order to ensure the connection to reality and stay up-to-date referring to practical 
relevance and ongoing missions of the Bundeswehr.103 
The connection between politics, civil society, and the Bundeswehr—or civil-
military relations—is the focus for an improvement in practice.104 Those three fields of 
German society have developed a variety of different stable and well-functioning elements 
of positive civil-military relations over many years. The following chapter attempts to point 
out a selection of fields for practical improvement with this principle in mind. (See Figure 
6 for a summary overview.) The Bundeswehr, German society, and German politics might 
still need a multitude of theoretically possible enhancements. Nevertheless, the emphasis 
is on practical possibilities within the EDEN-Principle that can be directly addressed in the 
following sections. 
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1. The Bundeswehr 
The Bundeswehr enjoys solid political and history education, but the leadership and 
subordinates have to focus on its practical relevancy of it. Referring to the Innere Führung, 
a broad and innovative, even creative approach can help to include political topics in   
everyday military life.105 This means in particular that the relevancy of current political 
circumstances and situations can be put into the context of history by the military leaders 
and also in everyday conversation. To do so effectively, they must be well educated. And 
committed to a task that demands special energy and skill. A further positive aspect of the 
focus on present-day relevancy is that this kind of conversation is not only limited to the 
internal life of the Bundeswehr, but it can spread out into many spheres of civil-military 
relations.  
In the context of this practical focus, a visit by troops and commands to civilian 
entities of government, society, education, culture and history can be an additional asset to 
get into touch with civilian contact points, to share opinions, to benefit from the exchange, 
and to strengthen the understanding of historical knowledge.106 Certainly, such visits 
already take place within the Bundeswehr, but a refocusing on the connection between 
history and topics that are perceived by every citizen today could further improve this 
already well-developed standard. Not just teaching knowledge but connecting the dots 
between now and then is the key to an individual experience and a possible change of 
individual perception. Open discussions (e.g., on specific military history topics), in a 
museum, a cenotaph, or at memorials, can be a helpful possibility to picture this practical 
context to the present. 
The development and maintenance of tradition is another vital aspect in the field of 
education and democracy. The revised and 2018 edition of the “German Armed Forces 
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Tradition Decree” [“Traditionserlass”]107 is a promising step in the direction of a healthy 
and democratic understanding of the military´s tradition. It does not exclude certain parts 
of the German history, especially referring to Nazi Germany and the former German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), but it focusses on developing and creating a tradition worth 
preserving that is meaningful for the Bundeswehr itself. In the context of these fields (i.e., 
the military and civil resistance against the Nazi Regime and any other anti-democratic 
elements in German and European history), there are wide and open fields to develop a 
modern and creative understanding of history and maintain the country´s own democratic 
tradition.  
All history must be generally covered in education and understood in context, but 
the emphasis rightly should fall on that which can be accepted as worthy of being part of 
the tradition for democratically-based and modern armed forces like the Bundeswehr in 
general. The “Center for Military History and Social Science in the Bundeswehr” (Zentrum 
für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften in der Bundeswehr) can provide help for 
military leaders in this approach as well as military schools and museums can do with their 
personnel. Furthermore, the “Zentrum Innere Führung” [Centre for Innere Führung] 
provides a software drive that is accessible for military personnel of all ranks in order to 
gain information, prepare presentations on political and historical topics, and to find 
various multimedia material for educational purposes.108 
The step from the educational first two fields of the EDEN-Principle into the last 
two fields of ethics and norms must focus on the ethos of the soldier, but also on positive 
civil-military relations in the German democracy. The individual self-perception of the 
soldier as an important part of German society is vital in the first step toward the ethos of 
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the soldier and a significant factor of attractivity.109 Overcoming the misperception that the 
soldier is not valued within German society must be a focus of this approach, despite all 
the challenges connected with this task. Although there is not yet a drastically growing gap 
between the Bundeswehr and society, the perception of such a gap especially in those who 
are combat veterans and otherwise is a reality. Therefore, the gap between perception and 
reality must be overcome by concerned soldier and civilians on a broad axis, as was done 
in the early years of the FRG and the Bundeswehr.  
Only an open and regular exchange between the Bundeswehr and German society 
can provide and maintain healthy civil-military relations in the future.110 This kind of 
dialog must not only be open, but also transparent in order to gain a better understanding 
and to work against the perceived “freundliches Desinteresse” (“friendly lack of 
interest”)111 of German society toward the Bundeswehr. This open and transparent dialog, 
can only be reached when the Bundeswehr can give up the current “traffic light policy”112 
that leads to a downplaying or even ignorance of mistakes and grievances within the 
military.113 Finally, an open dialog on the basis of a transparent military error culture 
between the Bundeswehr and German society can lead to an honest exchange that results 
in a better mutual understanding and a real self-perception beyond mere beliefs or opinions.  
On the basis of a strong, reality-bound, and healthy self-perception of citizenship 
and soldiering, as had, say, in Switzerland or Finland or in the UK, the ethos of the 
individual soldier can be further developed by a practically-focused training in order to 
solidify democratic and ethical values. Not only the exchange with German society in 
                                                 
109 Heiko Biehl, “Aus den Augen, aus dem Sinn? Überlegungen zur gesellschaftlichen Integration der 
Bundeswehr nach der Aussetzung der Wehrpflicht [Out of sight, out of mind? Reflections on the social 
integration of the Bundeswehr after the suspension of compulsory military service],” in Jahrbuch Innere 
Führung 2012 [yearbook Innere Führung 2012] (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2012), 60. 
110 Uwe Hartmann, Der Gute Soldat [The good Soldier] (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2018), 157. 
111 Former German Federal President Horst Köhler in: Hartmann, Innere Führung, 134. 
112 Note: The colloquially used “Ampelpolitik” [“traffic light policy”] is utilized within the German 
military to describe the process of reported grievances that turn from “red” [= poor] over “yellow” 
[=medium level] into “green” [very good] on their way through the several hierarchical levels from bottom 
to top. That means, the real condition or the real report can be rephrased and watered-down until it loses its 
actual negative content and finally turns into a positive outcome. 
113 Klaus Beckmann, Treue.Bürgermut.Ungehorsam. [loyalty. civil courage. disobedience] (Berlin: 
Miles-Verlag, 2015), 75ff. 
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community events or in an open dialog is a way to reach this aim, but also a military-
focused, mission-based approach can do so. In order to simplify such ethical values and 
transform them into a generally trainable concept for every individual soldier, a simple test 
that the soldier can do individually in every situation must be provided. 
The KEC-Test—”Koblenzer Entscheidungs-Check” (“Koblenz decision-making 
check”)—exactly provides a form of self-test for the individual soldier that not only helps 
to find the ethically right solution but also gives some general advice to stay within 
democratic norms.114 This practice test was developed by Anthony M. Pagano,115 but was 
adapted and is permanently evaluated and updated by the Zentrum Innere Führung (Centre 
for Innere Führung) today. The KEC-Test provides test criteria for individual action and 
behavior in five single steps. After the question if an action is legitimate, the individual 
soldier has to answer the question if the action would cause discontent in public opinion. 
In a third step, the soldier must answer if the action would be ethical and a good narrative 
for the family afterwards. The fourth step asks the religiously-based question—as a golden 
rule in general—if the action can be seen as something that one would wish to experience 
as well.116 The fifth and final question aims for the “kategorischer Imperativ” (“categorical 
imperative”), based on the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, which postulates to act 
justly  under the maxim of action that one would be willing to generalize.117 If the soldier 
would have to answer “no” to only one of these five questions, the individual outcome and 
advice would obviously be to find another solution or to avoid the planned action or 
behavior. The KEC-Test can be seen as a simplified ethical compass for the individual 
                                                 
114 Thomas R. Elßner, “Praxisorientierte Ethikausbildung in Den Deutschen Streitkräften [Practice-
Oriented Ethical Education in the Armed Forces],” in Entscheiden.Führen.Verantworten. Soldatsein Im 21. 
Jahrhundert [Decide. Lead. Answer. Being a Soldier in the 21. Century] (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles-
Verlag, 2011), 86ff. 
115 Anthony Pagano, “Criteria for Ethical Decision Making in Managerial Situations,” SSRN Electronic 
Journal, UIC College of Business Administration research paper, 10, no. 05 (August 1, 1987): 20. 
116 Note: „Alles, was Ihr also von anderen erwartet, das tut auch ihnen: Das ist das Gesetz und die 
Propheten.“ [All those things, then, which you would have men do to you, even so do you to them: because 
this is the law and the prophets.] (Holy Bible: Mt 7,12). 
117 „Handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die Du zugleich wollen kannst, daß sie ein allgemeines 
Gesetz werde.“ [„Only act according to the maxim by which you can at the same time want it to become a 
universal law.”] Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) in: Elßner, “Praxisorientierte Ethikausbildung in Den 
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soldier. Only permanently repeated training and practice, e.g., on drill grounds and in role 
plays, can establish a generally desired ethical behavior of every soldier as an outcome. In 
sum, it can lead to individual ethical certainty for general action and behavior that is rooted 
in democratic values. 
The German soldier should not develop a self-perception of a military superman 
outside of society but as an important part within it. Here, the EDEN-Principle must 
constantly be used to work on a democratically-based self-perception and the development 
of an ethos that roots in the core values of citizenship. Pride and military ethos anchored in 
constitutional values and discipline at the core of the soldierly profession can and must be 
a healthy element of this. The establishment of a new “warrior cult” or the Spartan special 
role above society, a development with a lousy past that is being revived quite widely in 
this world in the face of terrorism and irregular warfare118 A rejection of society or the 
denial of the checks and balances of German political structure would be equal to an 
increasing gap in civil-military relations and, therefore, cannot be the aim of a democratic 
country in general.119 A soldier needs the pride and the backing of the Bundeswehr´s core 
mission, but it must be rooted in the purpose of defending democracy and serving German 
society as “a good soldier,” not in standing apart or even above it.120 This syndrome that 
arose in the dynastic order reached its awful climax in the Wehrmacht in national socialism 
or in the Waffen SS. The soldier’s mission remains special and will always be thus. This is 
part of the purpose of a soldier´s duty, including the real possibility of war, combat, the 
uncertainties and sacrifice of service, which include fighting, and dying.121 Nevertheless, 
this part of a soldier´s duty can and may lead to a healthy form of pride in the Bundeswehr´s 
purpose and the individual´s special abilities, but it must not lead to the establishment of 
an anti-democratic ethos apart from German society. The Franco A. case showed the 
potential, however slight in the biography of this unfortunate officer, also at a time of 
                                                 
118 Beckmann, Treue.Bürgermut.Ungehorsam. [loyalty. civil courage. disobedience], 57ff, 82ff. 
119 Uwe Hartmann, Der Gute Soldat [The Good Soldier] (Miles-Verlag, 2018), 160. 
120 Hartmann, 159. 
121 Hartmann, Innere Führung, 173ff. 
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renationalization in Germany and Europe where militarism is once more a feature of the 
contemporary political world.  
The Innere Führung is an important basis for the ethos of the soldier, although it 
might not be perceived as such by many soldiers. Only half of the German soldiers have a 
broad knowledge about the regulation Innere Führung and just 14.2 percent dealt 
intensively with it or have deep and detailed knowledge about it.122 Nevertheless, 
especially referring to the associative understanding of ratings,123 common associations 
and a well-developed understanding of the values of Innere Führung can be observed.124 
Innere Führung can, therefore, be evaluated as a quite well-developed standard within the 
Bundeswehr, although these standards are not necessarily related to the regulation Innere 
Führung for every individual in general.  
As some soldiers have already lived their military life in the purest values of Innere 
Führung,125 it becomes obvious that the mere fact of giving those values a name is 
incidental. The vital aspect in it, indeed, is the function of the Innere Führung to act as the 
democratic frame of (and the military anchor in) the German Basic Law126 and 
democracy.127 The significance of the regulation becomes clear as the basis for democratic 
values within the Bundeswehr when one keeps in mind the continuity of challenges faced 
by soldiers and government in the facets of service in peace and war as well as the threats 
this study has attempted to analyze. A positive understanding and perception of the Innere 
Führung and its advantages are necessary for the individual to understand the connection 
                                                 
122 Angelika Dörfler-Dierken and Robert Kramer, Innere Führung in Zahlen. Streitkräftebefragung 
2013 [Innere Führung in numbers. Armed Forces poll 2013] (Berlin: Miles-Verlag, 2014), 19–20. 
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125 Viktor Toyka, Dienst in Zeiten des Wandels: Erinnerungen aus 40 Jahren Dienst als Marineoffizier 
1966-2006 [Service in the Times of Change: Memories over 40 years of Service as a Navy Officer 1966-
2006], 1st ed. (S.l.: Miles-Verlag, 2017). 
126 “Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.” 
127 Hans-Christian Beck, “Warum benötigt die Bundeswehr eine Führungskultur und ein soldatisches 
Leitbild? [Why does the Bundeswehr need a leadership culture and a soldier’s role model?],” in Schützen, 
Retten, Kämpfen – Dienen für Deutschland [Protect, Rescue, Fight - Serving for Germany], 1st ed. (Berlin: 
Miles-Verlag, 2016), 31–33. 
 47 
between Innere Führung, the German Basic Law and democratic values as the ethos of the 
soldier, to say nothing of fighting power in combat.  
After the development and the ongoing maintenance of ethical values, the outcome 
of the EDEN-Principle ideally should foster strong and resilient democratic norms. An 
individual self-perception within the ethos of the soldier as part of German society is the 
last step in this practical approach. Although this aim can be reached at some point, a 
permanent and repeatedly occurring reflection and evaluation must be ensured. The FMO 
Concept— “Führungsbegleitung in militärischen Organisationen” (“leadership mentoring 
in military organizations”)—is a current German example for such an evaluation 
process.128 Herein, the status quo in the military community can be evaluated, feedback 
can be provided, and a better outcome in practice can be achieved, based on democratic 
values and ethical norms of the Innere Führung.129 This complex multiple-step-process 
can help to reflect the outcome of the EDEN-Principle on a constantly recurring basis and 
can ensure a real feedback without any effects of organizational blindness. 
2. German Society 
The term civil-military relations has many sides. It depends on the collaboration 
and active exchange between government, society and the armed forces. After the 
suspension of conscription in 2011, reservists became even more important for this civil-
military exchange,130 but they cannot compensate for the total number of former conscripts. 
The lack of exchange and common topics between society and the Bundeswehr coincided 
with an epochal change in German politics and society; that is, the effects of the world 
depression, the geopolitical upheaval around and in Europe, and the revival of radical right 
wing politics in a country that had long eschewed this phenomenon. This process opened 
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the field for radical influences and the misperception of a growing civil-military gap instead 
of noticing the actually healthy democratic civil-military relations in practice.131 
Therefore, German society in its variety must also focus on a healthy self-
perception and an openness toward political, security-, or military-related topics in order 
to be aware of the realities of power and the best means to assure peace and security in a 
time of growing extremes. This active way of participation and discourse in every topic of 
German politics has to be based on the free will and demand for transparency by German 
society. The fact of the end or suspension of conscription in Germany may not lead to a 
public self-perception of a loss of responsibility by the citizen for his or her defense.132 
Because of this fact, the responsibility for security issues cannot be generally delegated to 
the Bundeswehr alone, but must be understood as a common task for all parts of German 
state and society. German society must develop a healthy self-perception of the will to 
defense as a feature of citizenship as part of the security environment. This fact includes 
the public responsibility for an overall resilience and the acceptance of the society´s own 
role regarding security and defense issues. As a consequence, a participation on and interest 
in security issues can not only be the task of the Bundeswehr or internal German politics, 
but it must also be a responsibility for all German citizens.133  Paraphrasing the Prussian 
reformers, in 1964 the former German brigadier-general Heinrich Karst (one of the authors 
of Innere Führung wrote: “Der Geist der Armee [hängt] zum beachtlichen Teil…von Geist 
und Verteidigungswillen des Volkes [ab]” (“The spirit of the army depends to a 
considerable extent on the spirit and the will to defense of the people”).134 In the end, 
security and defense are an inseparable task for democratic civil-military relations and 
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cannot be outsourced to a military elite in a professional army that seals itself off from 
society, or a society that turns it back on the needs of such soldiers within a democracy.  
Especially the media as part of society play an important role in the common 
perception. Military and security topics are not very popular in Germany, which is also a 
challenge for the state financed German media coverage. Security policy and defense issues 
are generally avoided as a “Igitt-Thema” (“repulsive topic”), which means that German 
media, intentionally or unintentionally, have created an unwelcome setting for military 
content as an outcome.135 Improved, transparent, and, as much as possible, objective media 
coverage must be encouraged in order to achieve an enhanced knowledge flow on military 
topics and the Bundeswehr in general, especially in areas in which the Bundeswehr has no 
obvious military biases.136 
Finally, a way to improve democratic civil-military relations can be pointed out in 
the field of opportunities to give insights into the civil sector for soldiers.137 This does not 
have to be just an obligation for German society, but it can be an opportunity to directly 
focus on regular soldiers who have benefited from military training, education, and 
leadership experience. After their time of service, the regular soldiers have to find their 
way back into the job market outside the Bundeswehr, and exactly this significant group of 
veterans can also be attractive for employers in the civil job market. Healthy and well-
developed civil-military relations are, therefore, always dependent on the observer´s point 
of view and can create opportunities apart from a democratic system, a strong level of 
resilience, and shared norms. 
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3. German Politics 
German politics must take open responsibility for the constitutional “Primat der 
Politik” (Primacy of Policy and Politics).138 Working together with the military leadership, 
German politics (i.e., the Bundestag [the parliament]), must focus on its leading role and 
create, as is practically possible,  clear guidance and backing for the soldiers entrusted to 
the parliament.139 German politics have a direct responsibility for the Bundeswehr and the 
political decisions for all military action.140 This constitutional responsibility can only be 
borne by German politics in a pluralistic and at time confused exchange with the 
Bundeswehr and German society. Not only the development and maintenance of Innere 
Führung must be part of this but also the transparent and open political dialogue on military 
decisions, political aims, and missions abroad must be faced in a public manner despite the 
demagoguery of the present and all its confusion.141 
It is the task of German politics to avoid the tendency to allow military affairs to 
degrade to a “Toxic Topic” in order to maintain an objective and wide information 
distribution for German society. Not only the political rhetoric comes into count for this 
but also the way in which military topics are covered in public, either subjective or 
objective. Toxic leadership, the opposite of good leadership, can be destructive for every 
organization and creates significant issues, especially for the inner military structure of the 
Bundeswehr.142 By forcing the Bundeswehr into becoming a fringe phenomenon for 
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society or part of a “Toxic Topic,” German politics would equal the picture of a toxic leader 
referring to their political role. The German Minister of Defense, Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, 
focused on the humanistic aspect of altruism in the Innere Führung when she stated: “Wer 
Menschen führen will, muss Menschen mögen” (“If you want to lead people, you have to 
like people”).143 This is perfect advice: to take responsibility and care of the entrusted 
personnel for every single part of German society, especially German politics. 
Finally, German politics do not generally have to focus on an increase of financial 
support for the Bundeswehr; the amount of financial support, however, must be better 
addressed to the political will and strategic aims. The operational and personnel capability 
of the Bundeswehr is vital for the very survival and the military value of German politics, 
but since the advent of the peace dividend and national unity a quarter century ago, defense 
affairs and resources have been constrained to the breaking point.144 The German  
Parliamentary Commissioner of the Armed Forces, Hans-Peter Bartels, recently confirmed 
in an official statement that he considers the Bundeswehr “derzeit nicht einsetzbar” 
(“currently not usable”).145 In this context, a gap between the political will or aims and the 
will to invest the necessary money to achieve those aims becomes visible. That means that 
a possible discrepancy between the political will—and also international responsibility—
to take part in a variety of missions abroad must be covered by the appropriate financial 
support in order to maintain military material, ensure supplies and endurance, and take care 
of the personnel. 
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Figure 6.  The EDEN-Principle—A practical approach for the Bundeswehr, 
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The EDEN-Principle is a chance to transform the Innere Führung into practice and, 
therefore, strengthen German resilience from within the Bundeswehr. Although the focus 
of this principle is obviously on the German Armed Forces, a positive and strengthening 
influence on German society becomes clearly visible for future development. In real 
practice, the differences between the military and society can be shown less than in the 
self-perception of individuals. Therefore, the focus must be on a change of individual self-
perception in order to create the ethos of the soldier as a strong and resilient reflection of 
the Innere Führung and the value of democratic norms in practice. 
The development and maintenance of shared norms of citizenship as an outcome of 
a democratic Bundeswehr within German society constitute the core value of the EDEN-
Principle. The perceived growing gap between the Bundeswehr and German society can be 
reduced through a change of perception and knowledge of facts instead of mere emotions, 
misperceptions, or beliefs. Especially, the aspects of the EDEN-Principle that focus on 
stronger civil-military relations and better communication among the three fields of 
politics, Bundeswehr, and society can lead to a stable democratic self-perception and a 
reliable level of resilience in the end. 
The nature of the EDEN-Principle reflects a permanent and ongoing process of 
revision and self-evaluation in order to stay focused on current realities instead of sticking 
to knowledge or perceptions that are already overcome. In this way, a strong level of 
resilience can be maintained over the generations through shared norms of democratically 
based civil-military relations as well as the values of a democratic Germany in general. The 
EDEN-Principle provides a simple and practice-focused way to implement the Innere 
Führung, develop and maintain democratic norms and, therefore, create an overall 
resilience for German society as a whole. 
 
 54 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 55 
V. CONCLUSION 
Since the Russian decision to redraw the map of Europe as part of a general onset 
of a new era of geopolitics, the fate of the German military in the practice of German 
government and European security has reemerged as a theme in the headlines of the years 
2016–2018. The morale and discipline of army is always as central to its mission as are its 
weapons and equipment. This thesis has chosen to analyze the imponderables of command, 
morale, discipline and constitutions when seen through the lens of the battle field. These 
battlefields are many and one does not match the other. The result of these issues and 
factors leads to the topic of this thesis, an analysis of means and principles to enliven the 
command practice of the German military in the wake of two decades of deployment far 
from home, the impact of terror and irregular warfare, and now the prospect of large scale 
aggression or highly aggressive subterfuge and coercion to overturn the post 1990 order. 
These factors lead to a term in German that cannot be translated into English, but which 
stands at the center of where all these issues meet. That is, the idea and practice of Innere 
Führung.  
The first chapter of this thesis had shown that the ongoing debate on Innere 
Führung is a reflection of the search for a role model and still a factor of insecurity in 
German self-perception of citizenship. A variety of factors, such as the mass migration 
toward Europe, lead to additional internal factors of instability for Germany and its society. 
Therefore, the current level of vulnerability could initially be pointed out for German 
society in this thesis  
The second chapter focused on external threats and destabilizing factors, such as 
hybrid threats and Russian information operations. The thesis had shown the importance 
of a development of a strong level of resilience and explained the psychological elements 
that stand behind the attempts of persuasion. As an outcome, the threat that NATO and the 
EU are currently facing highly affects Germany in an internal level as well. The 
Bundeswehr as a significant part of Germany has to build up and maintain a strong level 
of resilience in consequence. 
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In order to reach this aim, the final chapter presented the newly invented EDEN-
Principle as a way out of this dilemma. In order to simplify the already existing Innere 
Führung and its principle of the citizen in uniform as a role model, the EDEN-Principle 
focuses on the development and maintenance of the ethos of the soldier—based on 
democratic norms of citizenship— to ensure a strong level of resilience. In addition to a 
mere theory, the EDEN-Principle focuses on a practical implementation of these values, 
not only in the field of German military but also for German society and German politics. 
Finally, Innere Führung as a role model—including the citizen in uniform—is still 
a valuable and important factor to develop and maintain strong civil-military relations that 
can persist negative external influences through a strong level of resilience. Nevertheless, 
a practical improvement has proven as necessary in this thesis. Not only German society 
in general but also the Bundeswehr in specific have to face current external challenges of 
hybrid threats, especially Russian information operations, and internal social aspects of 
migration that can lead to a utilization of perceived fears and sorrows to develop radical 
political influences on a domestic level. Pointing out, analyzing, and understanding those 
influences and the own vulnerabilities opened the door for future improvement.  
The EDEN-Principle can provide a way of practical transformation of the Innere 
Führung to implement core values of citizenship as an outcome. Although the necessity 
for improvement in mostly practical aspects became obvious in this thesis, simple 
adaptations can lead to a promising and strong result of citizenship in the end. The EDEN-
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